Department/School
Philosophy
Date
2007
Document Type
Article
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.493.x
Abstract
The similarities between contemporary externalist theories of knowledge and classical Indian and Tibetan theories of knowledge are striking. Drawing on comparisons with Timothy Williamson's recent work, I address related topics in Indo‐Tibetan epistemology and show that correct analysis of these issues requires externalist theories of mind and knowledge. The topics addressed range from a discussion of possible Gettier cases in the Tibetan philosophical tradition to an assessment of arguments for and against the existence of factive mental states/events that fail to be knowledge states/events. I conclude by explaining how these matters in Indian and Tibetan epistemology can inform us about the viability of externalist epistemologies of the sort articulated by Williamson.
Volume
57
Issue
228
Published in
The Philosophical Quarterly
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
Citation/Other Information
Stoltz, Jonathan E. "Gettier and Factivity in Indo-Tibetan Epistemology." The Philosophical Quarterly 57, no. 228 (2007): 394-415. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.493.x