Title
Epistemological Disjunctivism and Easy Knowledge
Department/School
Philosophy
Date
2015
Document Type
Article
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0683-7
Abstract
Stewart Cohen argues that basic knowledge is problematic, as it implies that subjects can acquire knowledge or justified beliefs about certain matters in ways that are supposedly too easy. Cohen raises two versions of the problem of easy knowledge, one involving the principle of closure and the other track-record style bootstrapping reasoning. In this paper I confront the problem of easy knowledge from the perspective of epistemological disjunctivism about perception. I argue that disjunctivism can do a better job than dogmatism at responding to the version of the problem involving closure. I also argue that while disjunctivism would permit subjects to bootstrap their way to justified beliefs about the reliability of their perceptual powers, the disjunctivist can distinguish in a principled manner between this sort of bootstrapping and instances of it that we should agree are objectionable.
Volume
192
Published in
Synthese
Citation/Other Information
Stuchlik, Joshua. “Epistemological Disjunctivism and Easy Knowledge.” Synthese 192 (2015): 2647-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0683-7