Title

Epistemological Disjunctivism and Easy Knowledge

Department/School

Philosophy

Date

2015

Document Type

Article

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0683-7

Abstract

Stewart Cohen argues that basic knowledge is problematic, as it implies that subjects can acquire knowledge or justified beliefs about certain matters in ways that are supposedly too easy. Cohen raises two versions of the problem of easy knowledge, one involving the principle of closure and the other track-record style bootstrapping reasoning. In this paper I confront the problem of easy knowledge from the perspective of epistemological disjunctivism about perception. I argue that disjunctivism can do a better job than dogmatism at responding to the version of the problem involving closure. I also argue that while disjunctivism would permit subjects to bootstrap their way to justified beliefs about the reliability of their perceptual powers, the disjunctivist can distinguish in a principled manner between this sort of bootstrapping and instances of it that we should agree are objectionable.

Volume

192

Published in

Synthese

Citation/Other Information

Stuchlik, Joshua. “Epistemological Disjunctivism and Easy Knowledge.” Synthese 192 (2015): 2647-65. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0683-7

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