Title
The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics
Department/School
Philosophy
Date
2006
Document Type
Article
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819106318037
Abstract
Aristotelian virtue ethics is often charged with counseling a self-centred approach to the moral life. Reviewing some influential responses made by defenders of virtue ethics, I argue that none of them goes far enough. I begin my own response by evaluating two common targets of the objection, Aristotle and Aquinas, and based on my findings sketch the outlines of a clearly non-self-centred version of virtue ethics, according to which the ‘center’ is instead located in the agent’s right relation to others and ultimately to the Good. I conclude that while some species of virtue ethics may be self-centred, the objection cannot be used to indict the whole genus.
Volume
81
Issue
4
Published in
Philosophy
Citation/Other Information
Toner, Christopher H. "The Self-Centredness Objection to Virtue Ethics." Philosophy 81, no. 4 (2006): 595-618. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0031819106318037